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After the conclusion of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement (1867), the until-
then unified Habsburg Monarchy was divided into the Austrian (Cisleithan) 
and Hungarian (Transleithan) sections.11 Based on the new state and legal 
order, Dalmatia and Istria, together with the Slovenian lands, became a part 
of the Austrian half of the Monarchy, while banian Croatia, together with 
Vojvodina, became a part of the Hungarian half. A year later (1868), a Croato-
Hungarian Agreement was reached, which was a sub-dualist correction to the 
already established dualist system. With its 70 articles, the Agreement was 
the fundamental law governing Croato-Hungarian relations until 1918. First 
and foremost, it stipulated the inseparability of the lands of the Crown of St. 
Stephen. Furthermore, joint representation, joint action and joint governance 
were established for all spheres except domestic affairs, the judiciary, religion 
and public instruction, which were under the authority of the Territorial 
1  A. J. P. Taylor, Habsburška Monarhija 1809 – 1918 (Zagreb: Znanje, 1990), pp. 161-173.
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Governments of Croatia and Slavonia (banian Croatia). According to the 
provisions of the Agreement, Civil Croatia was subordinate to Hungary with 
reference to two vital issues: 1) the ban (viceroy) was appointed by the king 
at the proposal of the Hungarian minister president, while the minister for 
Croatia and Slavonia was not accountable to the Croatia Sabor, but rather to 
the joint parliament in Budapest; and 2) in financial terms, banian Croatia was 
entirely dependent on Hungary, for its budget was approved by the Hungarian 
finance minister. The question of control over the city of Rijeka was resolved 
to Hungary’s benefit by an annex, the so-called “Rijeka scrap”, which Croatian 
Sabor never ratified.2 Despite the numerous limitations which ensued from 
this Agreement, it nonetheless allowed for the modernization of Croatia’s then 
already obsolete governing institutions by means of autonomous legislation.3
Based on a decision made at the Congress of Berlin (1878), the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy was granted the right to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which was under the sovereignty of the Ottoman sultan.4 The annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was implemented by imperial proclamation on 5 October 
1908. This newly-annexed territory, which had the status of a condominium, 
was administered by the joint Austro-Hungarian finance minister.5
I. Ivo Pilar’s Political activity prior to the outbreak of World War I 
(1906-1912)
Ivo Pilar (1874-1933) was a Doctor of Laws (LL D), and he had a long career 
as an attorney. The depth of his knowledge and the breadth of his interests 
and accomplishments in the arts, political geography, political science, social 
psychology, anthropology, economics, religious studies and other fields place 
him among the ranks of the most distinguished Croatian intellectuals of the 
twentieth century.
2   Jaroslav Šidak, Mirjana Gross, Igor Karaman and Dragovan Šepić, Povijest hrvatskog naroda 
g. 1860 - 1914. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1968), 38-43; Vasilije Krestić, Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba 
(Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti – Naučno delo, 1969); Josip Šarinić, Nagod-
bena Hrvatska: Postanak i osnove ustavne organizacije (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 
1972).
3   Dalibor Čepulo, “Hrvatsko-ugarska nagodba i reforme institucija vlasti u Hrvatskom saboru 
1868.-1871.,” Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 2001, Suppl., no. 1: 117-148.
4   See: V. P. Potemkin, ed., Historija diplomacije, 3 vols. (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1951), 2: 37-
45.
5   See: Ferdo Čulinović, Državnopravna historija jugoslavenskih zemalja XIX. i XX. vijeka. (Hr-
vatska, Slavonija i Dalmacija, Istra, Srpska Vojvodina, Slovenija, Bosna i Hercegovina te Država 
SHS), 2 vols. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1953), 1: 309-326; Robert J. Donia, Islam pod Dvoglavim 
orlom: Muslimani Bosne i Hercegovine 1878-1914. (Zagreb – Sarajevo: Naklada ZORO – Institut 
za historiju BiH, 2000).
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After the completion of his university studies, Pilar left his native Zagreb 
and moved to Bosnia-Herzegovina (1900). After several years spent in Sarajevo, 
he then moved to Tuzla, where he opened a law office (1905).6 At the time 
of his arrival in Bosnia, an undisputed authority in both religious and even 
political matters among the local Catholic Croats was the Vrhbosna (Sarajevo) 
archbishop, Josip Stadler. During his long service as bishop, he acquired 
numerous adversaries on all sides due to conflicts between irreconcilable 
religious and political interests. Among the fierce critics of his work, besides 
the local Franciscan community,7 were the members of the small Catholic lay 
intelligentsia, whose ranks included Ivo Pilar.
The benediction of the flag of the Vlašić Choral Society in Dolac, near 
Travnik, proved an opportune moment to begin developing political activity in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina that will eventually evolve as independent of Archbishop 
Stadler.8 At that time, the decision was made to establish a religious-cultural 
organisation under the name Croatian Peope’s Union (Hrvatska narodna 
zajednica – HNZ). The Committee of Six was formed for this purpose, and Pilar 
joined it as the representative of Tuzla County.9 The Committee was charged 
with drafting a charter and setting up the new organisation. In November 
1907, the Land Government in Sarajevo and the Joint Finance Ministry in 
Vienna approved the by-laws of the HNZ.10 It would appear that the key to 
their approval was the fact that the leaders of this new organisation called for 
the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austro-Hungary, a matter on which 
the top leadership of the Monarchy had already made a general decision.11 
The constitutive session of the HNZ Central Committee was held at the end 
of February 1909. Pilar also joined this Committee, and he was also elected 
chairman of the HNZ County Committee in Donja Tuzla.12
In contrast to Stadler’s desire for the Union to be a confessional 
organisation of the Croatian Catholics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the non-
clergy members of the Central Committee, advocating inter-confessional 
principles, insisted that it should also be open to the local Muslims. These were 
two opposing and incompatible concepts for the organisation of the Croats 
6   Srećko Lipovčan, “Životopis Ive Pilara,” Godišnjak Pilar, 1 (2001): 269.
7   See: Velimir Blažević, Bosanski franjevci i nadbiskup dr. Josip Stadler (Sarajevo: Svjetlo riječi, 
2000).
8   Jure Krišto, “Uloga Ive Pilara u hrvatskom organiziranju u Bosni i Hercegovini,” Godišnjak 
Pilar, 1 (2001): 86; see also his article “Heeding a Good or an Evil Angel: The May Declaration of 
1917 and the Collapse of the Middle-European Monarchy,” Review of Croatian History, 4 (2008), 
no. 1: 39-50 (42-43).
9   Luka Đaković, Političke organizacije bosanskohercegovačkih Hrvata. (I. dio: Do otvaranja Sabo-
ra 1910.) (Zagreb: Globus, 1985), p. 229.
10   Ibid., pp. 231-232.
11   Ibid., p. 231.
12   Ibid., pp. 232-233. 
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of Bosnia-Herzegovina. An open conflict between Archbishop Stadler and 
the HNZ was not long in coming. In February 1908, the Sarajevo archbishop 
informed the Union’s leadership that he could not approve its by-laws.13 An 
attempt – in which Pilar participated – to reach a resolution to this dispute, 
i.e. a pledge by the Central Committee to adjust the HNZ”s rules to comply 
with the archbishop’s wishes regarding a confessional organisation of Catholic 
Croats, did not yield the desired result, and each side fell back to its initial 
positions.14 In attempting to explain the causes of the conflict, Pilar claimed 
that the archbishop himself bore the brunt of the blame, for under his political 
leadership Croatian interests were allegedly left unprotected, and he also did 
not want to relinquish political leadership of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
to laypersons.15 The conflict reached its peak when the Croatian Catholic 
Association was established at Stadler’s behest.16 The establishment of a new 
political organisation made the rift among the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
even deeper and more unbridgeable.
Until 1912, Pilar was one of most outspoken political opponents of 
Archbishop Stadler, only to transform, almost unexpectedly, into one of his 
close associates. This turnabout in Pilar’s political life ensued after he became 
convinced of the unwillingness of the leadership of the Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina to accept the HNZ’s stance on the necessity of creating a Croatian/
Catholic-Muslim political bloc, which could then successfully oppose the 
efforts of the Serbs to draw Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Monarchy and annex 
it to the Kingdom of Serbia. As Pilar understood it, the survival of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a part of the Monarchy guaranteed the territorial integrity of 
this Austro-Hungarian territory, and simultaneously improved its chances of 
forming formal state (constitutional) ties with Croatia. In opposition to Pilar’s 
expectations, the Muslim club in the Land Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
together with the Serbs, supported the autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e. 
opposing its unification with Croatia (1912).17
The looming World War imposed new circumstances upon Pilar, under 
which he, together with like thinkers, struggled to create the optimum 
conditions for the survival and further overall development of the Croatian 
people in the Central European geopolitical space.
13   Ibid., pp. 271-273.
14   Ibid., pp. 273-275. 
15   Zajedničar [I. Pilar], Nadbiskup Stadler i Hrv. Nar. Zajednica (Sarajevo: 1910), pp. 5-9. Cf. J. 
Krišto, “Uloga Ive Pilara u hrvatskom organiziranju u Bosni i Hercegovini,” 88-91.
16   On the emergence of the Croatian Catholic Association and its relations with the HNZ; see: 
L. Đaković, Političke organizacije, pp. 325-353.
17   Zoran Grijak, Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa Josipa Stadlera (Zagreb: Hrvatski 
institut za povijest – Vrhbosanska nadbiskupija – Dom i svijet, 2001), p. 536.
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II. Political activities of Ivo Pilar during the first World War (1914-
1918)
The ominous gunshots in Sarajevo fired on the Feast of St. Vitus (28 June) 
in 1914 from the gun of the youthful Serbian assassin Gavrilo Princip was the 
spark that ignited the First World War, which ushered in the collapse of four 
empires: the German, Russian, Austrian and Ottoman.
a) Ivo Pilar and Stadler’s “Memorandum” to Pope Benedict XV (January 1915)
After the outbreak of war, the Kingdom of Italy, a rather capricious member 
of the Central Powers, remained temporarily neutral. Sarajevo Archbishop 
Stadler, known as a man who favoured the Frankist-Rightist stance on 
a political solution to the status of the Croatian lands in the Monarchy, i.e. 
“trialism”,18 had received reliable information on the attempts of the Entente 
powers (Great Britain, France and Russia) to get Italy to enter the war on their 
side. Fearing that the success of this plan could alter the balance of power 
among the warring sides and lead to the military and political defeat of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, he sent a “Memorandum” to Pope Benedict 
XV on 28 January 1915, beseeching him to call for the maintenance of Italian 
neutrality in the world conflict. Even though Archbishop Stadler drafted and 
signed the “Memorandum”, its actual author was Pilar.19
It is well known that Pope Benedict XV exercised his great diplomatic 
skill to prevent Italy’s entry into the war on the side of the Entente. Indeed, 
he encouraged the Monarchy’s top officials to make territorial concessions to 
their insatiable neighbour across the sea. Negotiations between the two states 
ceased at that moment when, under the secret Treaty of London (26 April 
1915), the members of the Entente guaranteed much greater territorial gains 
to Italy than the Monarchy was prepared to make.20 An once fickle ally became 
a bitter enemy on the battlefield.
b) Pilar’s “Memorial” to Archbishop Stadler (July 1917)
During the final two years of the First World War, Pilar attempted to find 
the best solution for the burning “South Slav”, in fact Croatian, question within 
the framework of the dualistically organised Monarchy and thereby ensure its 
continued existence as a European great power in the Danubian basin and on 
the Balkan peninsula.
18   On “trialism” and its protagonists, see: M. Gross, “Hrvatska politika velikoaustrijskog kruga 
oko prijestolonasljednika Franje Ferdinanda,” Časopis za suvremenu povijest 2 (1970), no. 2: 
9-74.
19   Z. Grijak, “Ivo Pilar i Stadlerova promemorija papi Benediktu XV., g. 1915.,” Godišnjak Pilar, 
1 (2001): 108.
20   Milan Marjanović, Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915. Prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-
1917. (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1960).
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After the emperor and king, Francis Joseph I, who ascended to the throne 
long before in 1848, died in November 1916, Slovenian, Serbian, Croatian and 
Muslim  politicians began to reorient their policies toward demands for greater, 
or even complete independence of their then divided (in the formal state sense) 
territories within the two halves of the Monarchy. They based their demands 
on the “national principle”, i.e. the “right of nations to self-determination” and 
– the “Croatian state right”. These two principles were explicitly emphasised 
by the members of the Yugoslav Club in the Imperial Council in Vienna, i.e. 
the parliament of the Austrian half of the Monarchy, in the “May Declaration” 
(1917).21 The Pythically worded text of the Declaration left it open to various 
interpretations, depending which political option exploited it to achieve its 
ends.22 
Being among the first to perceive that the ultimate aim of the advocates of 
the “May Declaration” was the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
and the creation of an independent Yugoslav state, Pilar sent the “Memorial on 
the Solution to the South Slav Question” (“Denkschrift über die südslavische 
Frage”) to Archbishop Stadler at the end of May 1917.23 Analysing the current 
global political situation and its impact on the “South Slav question”, he 
proposed, as an “optimum solution”, that the “South Slav provinces become 
unified into a single administrative territory which would consist of: Croatia, 
Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Istria, Carniola, Southern Steiermark 
to the Drava River, Gorica (Gorizia) and Gradiška (Gradisca). He foresaw a 
special status for Trieste, whereby this port would be directly subordinated to 
central state authority.24 In the “Memorial” he expressed particular concern 
over the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Pilar, Serbian politics had 
managed to abuse the idea of “national unity” between Serbs and Croats in the 
interest of their own expansionist policies: “If the Serbs and Croats are one 
nation, then it logically follows that the Serbs, based on the national principle, 
are entitled to aspire to the unification of all South Slav provinces into one 
Greater Serbian state”.25 Furthermore, he maintained that the United States 
of America under President Woodrow Wilson had accepted the idea that 
Bosnia-Herzegovina “must be torn” from the Monarchy based on the national 
21   Ferdo Šišić, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914.-1919. (Zagreb: 
Matica hrvatska, 1920), p. 94.
22   J. Krišto, “Heeding a Good or an Evil Angel;” Zlatko Matijević, “Reakcije frankovačkih pra-
vaša na “Svibanjsku deklaraciju” i njezine promicatelje (1917.-1918.),” Franjo Emanuel Hoško, 
ed., Prošlost obvezuje: Povijesni korijeni Gospićko-senjska biskupije, Zbornik biskupa Mile Bogo-
vića (Rijeka: Teologija u Rijeci – Riječki teološki časopis, 2004), pp.439-474.
23   National and University Library, Zagreb, Collection of Old and Rare Books and Manuscript 
Collection; Ivo Pilar Bequest (hereinafter: NSK OIP), R-5708.
24   Ibid., p. 7.
25   Ibid., p. 6.
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principle, and relinquished to Serbia.26 Assuming that the unification of all 
“South Slav lands” of the Monarchy could encounter insurmountable barriers, 
Pilar proposed a “minimal solution”, i.e. the “unification of Croatia, Slavonia, 
Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina”.27 This state unit, in his view, would have the 
“national, geopolitical and economic conditions for successful development”.28 
Without this “minimal solution” at the very least, Pilar asserted that it would 
be impossible to find any solution to the “South Slav question”, and that this 
would ultimately have negative consequences for the Monarchy and its further 
existence as a state.29
c) The “Memorandum” of the Stadler-Pilar Political Circle to Emperor Charles 
(August 1917)
Concern over the survival of the Monarchy and the future of the Croatian 
people prompted Archbishop Stadler and Pilar to take concrete political action. 
The “Memorandum on a Solution to the South Slav Question” (“Promemoria 
über die Lösung der südslavischen Frage”) was prepared for Charles I (IV), the 
emperor and king.30
The “Memorandum”, which bears Stadler’s or Pilar’s name in historiography, 
begins with the assertion that in the period since the conclusion of the Austro-
Hungarian Agreement (1867) to the outbreak of the First World War (1914), 
the “South Slav question” was the “most pressing component of the Eastern 
Question” for the Monarchy, which has “perniciously” influenced internal 
politics in the state.31 In the expectation that the members of the Central Powers 
(Germany and Austro-Hungary) would secure victory over the countries 
of the Entente and their allies, Stadler and Pilar and their adherents did not 
believe this would lead to significant changes that would enable the easing of 
tensions and the establishment of lasting solutions in international relations 
in Europe. This is precisely why they stressed that the time had come when 
the Monarchy, out of “an obligation to itself ”, must regulate the “South Slav 
question” so that it would “cease to be the Achilles’ heel of the entire state”.32 The 
writers of the “Memorandum” were aware that the solution to the “South Slav 
question” could not be tied to the “general reconstruction of the Monarchy” 
and the outright revivification of “trialism”.33 Calling for Croatia, Slavonia, 
Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina “to combine into a single administrative 
26   Ibid., p. 7.
27   Ibid., p. 8.
28   Ibid.
29   Ibid.
30   NSK OIP, R-5704b.
31   Ibid., 1.
32   Ibid., 2.
33   Ibid.
Z. MATIJEVIĆ, Ivo Pilar and the art of the possible: Croatia between central...
92
territory”,34 the Stadler-Pilar political circle formally did not encroach upon 
the essence of the Monarchy’s dualist structure. However, the creation of a 
new “unified administrative territory” and its constitutional organisation as 
a joint possession of Austria and Hungary abrogated vital elements of the 
dualist system.35 In other words, the Stadler-Pilar “Memorandum” sought the 
reorganisation of the Monarchy on the basis of “concealed trialism” in the form 
of a condominium.
The “Memorandum” was delivered to the emperor in mid-August 1917 
by Pilar and Josip Vancaš in a private audience requested by Archbishop 
Stadler.36
d) The Stadler-Pilar “Declaration” (November, 1917)
The president of the Yugoslav Club and one of the writers and co-signatories 
of the “May Declaration”, Anton Korošec, a Catholic priest, travelled to Sarajevo 
on 31 August 1917.37 His intention was to become familiar with the positions 
of the leading politicians and religious representatives of the time in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. What interested him the most was the opinion of Archbishop 
Stadler and his political group on the political programme encapsulated in the 
“May Declaration”. The Slovenian politician received an explanation of their 
views from Pilar, who actually reiterated what had already been stated in the 
“Memorandum on the Solution to the South Slav Question”.38 In other words, 
no support for the “May Declaration” could be expected from this group.
Korešec compensated the failure in talks with Stadler’s group with success 
among the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Franciscans, who, in the following 
months, threw their unconditional support behind the “May Declaration”.39
In November 1917, Stadler’s so-called “Declaration” was released. Its 
content was diametrically opposed to the “May Declaration” of the Yugoslav 
Club. In its second point, the Declaration read: “We demand the unification 
of those lands over which the Croatian state right extends, meaning Croatia, 
34   Cited according to: L. V. Südland [I. Pilar], Južnoslavensko pitanje: Prikaz cjelokupnog pitanja 
(Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1943), p. 398.
35   For Pilar”s views on dualism, see: Stjepan Matković, “Političke prilke ‘nagodbene’ Hrvatske u 
očima Ive Pilara,” Godišnjak Pilar, 1 (2001): 51-66.
36   Z. Matijević, “Državno-pravne koncepcije dr. Ive Pilara i vrhbosanskoga nadbiskupa dr. Jo-
sipa Stadlera. Od Promemorije do Izjave klerikalne grupe bosansko-hercegovačkih katolika 
(kolovoz-prosinac 1917),” Godišnjak Pilar, 1 (2001): 121.
37   Momčilo Zečević, Slovenska ljudska stranka i jugoslovensko ujedinjenje 1917 - 1921. Od Maj-
ske deklaracije do vidovdanskog ustava (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju - NIP Export-
Press, 1973), pp. 92-94.
38   L. Đaković, Položaj Bosne i Hercegovine u austro-ugarskim koncepcijama rješenja južnoslaven-
skog pitanja 1914 - 1918. (Tuzla: Univerzal, 1980), pp. 176-177.
39   B.[onifac] Badrov, “Odjek svibanjske deklaracije u Bosni,” Franjevački Vijesnik, 35 (1928), no. 
12: 363-365.
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Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatian Istria, into a single 
political and financial, inviolable state body merged with the Habsburg 
Monarchy as a whole.”40
The “Declaration” was signed by Archbishop Stadler, but not only in his 
own name but also “on behalf of 51 exemplary citizens from Sarajevo and the 
provinces”, whose signatures were not made public. The “Declaration” had 
appended to it a relatively extensive, unsigned article entitled “To the Defence 
of Croatianhood”, containing a discursive rejection of the “May Declaration” 
programme as politically unrealistic, and advocating a solution that would be 
based on the demands set forth in the “Declaration”, i.e. one exclusively based 
on the Croatian state right.41
Stadler’s “Declaration” immediately provoked divided reactions: the 
adherents of the “May Declaration” – notable among them members of the 
Croatian Catholic Seniority42 and the Croatian Catholic Movement, an elite 
clerical-lay organisation43 – attacked it fiercely, while some of the Catholic 
clergy, the Party of the State Right (Frankists) and Radić’s Croatian Popular 
Peasant Party endorsed it.44
Few on the political scene of the time believed that the Sarajevo archbishop 
was the actual initiator and author of the “Declaration”. Suspicion was first 
aimed at the territorial chief official in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Stjepan 
Sarkotić,45 who was thought to have exerted influence on Archbishop Stadler 
through Pilar and Ivica Pavičić to release the “Declaration” with his signature.46 
However, the style of the “Declaration” itself and the accompanying article 
indicated that the actual author was Pilar, which he in fact confirmed roughly 
ten years afterward.47
e) Pilar’s “Memorial” to Count Tisza (September 1918)
In early 1918, the situation on Europe’s battlefields seemed more than 
40   F. Šišić, Dokumenti, pp. 103-104.
41   Z. Matijević, “‘Izjava’ vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa dr. Josipa Stadlera iz studenoga 1917. godi-
ne,” Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 31 (1999), no. 1: 65.
42   Z. Matijević, “Hrvatski katolički seniorat i politika (1912.-1919.),” Croatica christiana perio-
dica, 24 (2000), no. 46: 121-162.
43   See: J. Krišto, Hrvatski katolički pokret (1903. - 1941.) (Zagreb: Glas koncila - Hrvatski institut 
za povijest, 2004).
44   Z. Matijević “‘Izjava’ vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa dr. Josipa Stadlera iz studenoga 1917. godine,” 
51-72.
45   See: Ernest Bauer, Der letzte Paladin des Reiches. Generaloberst Stefan Freiherr Sarkotić von 
Lovćen (Graz – Wien – Köln: Verlag Styria, 1988).
46   Marijo Matulić, “Postanak Jugoslavije,” Seljački Kalendar za god. 1928., (1927): 44-45.
47   Božidar Jančiković, “Ivo Pilar u svjetlu nepoznatih dokumenata,” Godišnjak Pilar, 1 (2002): 
242.
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auspicious for the Central Powers: Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey). Namely, on 9 February 1918, the 
Central Powers concluded a peace with the then re-established independent 
Ukrainian state. Three weeks later, on 3 March 1918, they signed a favourable 
peace treaty in Brest-Litovsk with the new Soviet (Bolshevik) government 
in Russia. Two months later, on 7 May 1918, Romania fell before German/
Austro-Hungarian military onslaught and was compelled to sue for a separate 
peace. Several weeks earlier, on 21 March 1918, the German Supreme 
Military Command, buoyed by its previous military successes, launched its 
great spring offensive on the western front. They were not without success. 
The British-French frontline began to falter under the brunt of the German 
attack. The German armed forces came to within 70 kilometres of Paris. The 
Central Powers had almost no doubt in their ultimate victory.48 However, the 
unexpectedly successful counterattacks mounted by the allied armies under 
the command of Marshal Ferdinand Foch halted the German advances. The 
fortunes of war once more turned to the Entente powers. Even though the 
defeat of the Central Powers was becoming increasingly apparent, the members 
of the Entente still were uncertain as to who was “enemy number one”. For the 
Kingdom of Italy, this was certainly the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. For the 
remaining allied countries – France, Great Britain and the United States – it 
was Germany. None of these states foresaw the complete dismantlement of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in their wartime objectives. Even Italy only 
wanted a partial reduction of its territory. In other words, the leading political 
circles in the Entente countries were reserved over the possible division of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the creation of a Yugoslav state composed 
of some of the latter’s provinces together with the Kingdoms of Serbia and 
Montenegro. Even the Serbian government, which was still in exile on the 
island of Corfu, had two solutions concerning the possible fate of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy: one “maximum” and one “minimum”. The “maximum” 
solution projected the partition of the Monarchy, based on the “ethnographic 
principle”, into those territories in which the “South Slav peoples” (Slovenes, 
Croats and Serbs) lived and their unification with the Kingdom of Serbia, 
after the latter’s re-establishment in its pre-war boundaries. The “minimum” 
solution would be limited to the creation of a “Greater Serbia”, i.e. a Serbia that 
would encompass within its borders those parts of the Monarchy in which the 
Serbs, allegedly, had an “clear-cut” or “predominant majority”.49
Despite its relatively favourable foreign policy and military status, the Dual 
Monarchy was experiencing a growing internal crisis with each passing day, 
mostly due to the dissatisfaction of its Slavic peoples (Poles, Czechs, Slovenes, 
48   Bogdan Krizman, “Stvaranje jugoslavenske države. (Referat na Drugom kongresu historičara 
Jugoslavije),” Historijski pregled, 4 (1958), no. 3-4: 167-168.
49   Ibid., 170.
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Croats, Serbs and others), as well as the discord between the Austrian Germans 
and the Hungarians, the two dominant peoples of the Monarchy. The deepest 
crisis was occurring in the southern arm of the Monarchy.
Charles I had already perceived the full importance of the “South Slav 
question” to the further destiny of the Monarchy. In his efforts to find a solution 
to save his state, the ruler decided to entrust a vital “fact-finding mission” to 
the former Hungarian minister president, Count István Tisza, who was still 
considered the most powerful political figure in Hungary. Summoning Tisza 
from the south-west front, Emperor Charles received him in an audience on 7 
September 1918 and entrusted him as a homo regius to travel to the “South Slav 
lands” of the Monarchy and attempt to find a salutary formula which would 
save the Habsburg state from impending doom.50
 The first stop on Tizsa’s major political tour of the Monarchy’s 
south was Zagreb, where he arrived on 13 September 1918.51 A week later 
Tisza travelled to Sarajevo, where he meet with many, primarily pro-
Yugoslav Bosnian-Herzegovinian politicians from all three “ethno-religious” 
communities (Croatian Catholic, Serbian Orthodox and Bosniak Muslim).52 
At the recommendation of General Sarkotić, Tisza received anti-Yugoslav 
politicians Pilar and Vancaš, who were at the time members of the Frankist 
Party of the State Right branch in Bosnia-Herzegovina.53
During their second audience with Tisza on 22 September 1918, Pilar 
presented the Hungarian count with a “Memorial” (“Denkschrift”),54 whereby 
he intended to justify the “pro-Austrian orientation” of his political circle 
in the attempt to secure the state and legal unification of all Croatian lands, 
into which he included Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Istria.55
In his “Memorial”, Pilar expounded his view of the relationship of the 
Hungarians to the Croats during their eight centuries of life in a common 
50   B. Krizman, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu: Hrvatsko-srpski politički odnosi (Zagreb: Glo-
bus, 1989), p. 251.
51   B. Krizman, “O putu grofa Stj. Tisze po jugoslavenskim zemljama u septembru 1918,” Histo-
rijski zbornik, 11-12 (1958-59): 233-249.
52   B. Krizman, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, pp. 254-261; F. Šišić, Dokumenti, pp. 161-165.
53   B. Krizman, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 252, note 34. On Pilar’s party involvement 
see: Z. Matijević, “Dr. Ivo Pilar na stranicama pravaškog časopisa “Kroatische Rundschau”,” Go-
dišnjak njemačke narodnosne zajednice, (2005): 35-51.
54   NSK OIP, R-5710.
55   NSK OIP, R-5710, 1. In explaining the extent of the Croatian lands to Tisza, Pilar instructed 
him to read his book Die südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg (Vienna: Manzsche k.u.k. Hof-, 
Verlags- u. Universitäts- Buchhandlung, 1918). On the fate of Pilar’s book, see: S. Lipovčan, 
“Pilarovo djelo Južnoslavensko pitanje,” Godišnjak Pilar, 1 (2001): 193-232.
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state.56 According to this view, this state union succeeded for so long because 
the Hungarians did not question the existence of Croatian statehood.57 
The problems between the two peoples, Pilar asserted, only emerged in the 
nineteenth century when the “idea of unitary Hungarian state” appeared.58
In his further analysis of Croato-Hungarian relations, Pilar expressed his 
great bewilderment over Hungarian sympathies for the Serbs. To him, such 
sympathies served as proof that the Hungarians understood “neither the 
objectives nor nature of Serbian nationalism”, for the “goals of the Serbs were 
to enfeeble and ultimately assimilate the Bulgars and Croats and to unify the 
entire Slavic Balkans into a Greater Serbia”.59 For Pilar there was no doubt 
that the Serbian Orthodox Church was slated to play the principal role in the 
achievement of the Greater Serbian state idea: “the Serbian Orthodox national 
church is an instrument of implementation; it is more a battle-ready and 
conquering socio-political organisation than a religious community (...)”.60
The unresolved constitutional status of the Croatian lands had compelled the 
Croats, in Pilar’s opinion, “to become largely prepared to accept as a substitute 
[for a Croatian state within the Monarchy] a Serbo-Croatian state outside of 
the Monarchy, and this is the fundamental idea underlying Yugoslavism”.61
Finally, in his “Memorial” Pilar proposed the following solution to the 
burning constitutional question in the Monarchy’s south: “1. Croatia, Slavonia, 
Dalmatia, Bosnia and the Istrian islands shall be unified into a Croatian 
kingdom; 2. politically, the Croatian kingdom shall be in the hands of the 
Croats and the Croatian programme shall be implemented appropriately; 3. the 
Croatian kingdom shall be incorporated into the dualist system in the form of 
sub-dualism, and it shall exercise partial sovereignty within the framework of 
the crown lands of St. Stephen, and the conditions for this are a) the guarantee 
of Croatia’s unconditional national and state individuality and the possibility of 
developing the economy and trade in its new territory unimpeded; b) Austria’s 
consent for such a solution”.62
Pilar’s “Memorial” was yet another attempt to reorganise the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy along the lines of the “concealed trialism” principle, i.e. 
to formally retain the dualist structure of the state, while nonetheless carrying 
forward the formal state unification of all Croatian lands, including Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This proposal stood in stark contrast to the Hungarian intentions 
56   NSK OIP, R-5710, [3-4].
57   Ibid., [4].
58   Ibid.
59   Ibid., [4-5].
60   Ibid., [5].
61   Ibid., [4].
62   B. Krizman, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, pp. 259-260.
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of reinforcing the dualist system, which included plans to directly link Bosnia-
Herzegovina to Hungary as a “corpus separatum”.63
Pilar’s attempts to reorganise the Monarchy did not, as one could only 
expect, meet with Tisza’s approval.
f) Pilar’s Lecture at the “Austrian Political Society” in Vienna (October 1918)
The day after Tisza’s departure, 24 September 1918, the new joint finance 
minister, Alexander Spitzmüller von Harmersbach, arrived in Sarajevo.64 Three 
days later, Pilar boarded the train from Sarajevo and travelled to Vienna, as he 
had been invited by Minister Spitzmüller to deliver a lecture on the solution to 
constitutional and national problems in the Monarchy’s southern territories.
Pilar arrived in Vienna in the sombre atmosphere of the final weeks of 
existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He held two lectures at the 
“Austrian Political Society”.65 Unfortunately, the content of the first lecture is 
not known. In the second lecture, held on 12 October and aimed at the Austro-
German political public, Pilar asserted that the “pressing nature of the South 
Slav question” lies in the fact that the war, which was “‘set off ’ by this question” 
threatened “the Monarchy with an extremely unpleasant end”.66 In Pilar’s 
opinion, the “most fatal” aspect in the entire constitutional and political knot 
in the Monarchy’s south was that the “South Slav question with the existing 
legal grounds and power relations can no longer be resolved legally”.67 Despite 
this devastating conclusion, Pilar offered a possible solution: “I believe [...] that 
the new construction [of the Monarchy] can only be conducted on a federalist 
foundation. The existing Monarchy can now only be a federal state composed 
of several smaller nation states. A South Slav federal state may also be included 
within the framework of this federal state”.68
Pilar closed his lecture with words which seemed to forecast the numerous 
tragic historical upheavals in Central Europe over the course of the last century 
of the second millennium of the Christian era: “All nations need the Monarchy 
in their present-day territories, and if they momentarily forget it, then they 
shall soon learn to value it in the harsh school of life”.69
Pilar radicalised his views on a possible solution not only to the “South 
Slav question”, which for him was essentially identical to the solution to the 
63   Z. Grijak, Politička djelatnost, p. 554.
64   Alexander Spitzmüller, “… und hat auch Ursach, es zu lieben” (Wien – München – Stuttgart – 
Zürich: Wilhelm Frick-Verlag, 1955), pp. 252-256.
65   NSK OIP, R-5712, 1.
66   Ibid., 1-2.
67   Ibid., 10.
68   Ibid., 13.
69   Ibid., 16.
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status of the Croatian lands, but also to the survival of the entire Monarchy, 
for he discarded “concealed trialism” and openly advocated the federalisation 
of the Habsburg state. The transformation of the Dual Monarchy into a federal 
state would have, in his opinion, solved all of Croatia’s constitutional problems 
with the Austrian and Hungarian components of the state.
However, all of the efforts exerted by Pilar and his political adherents to 
reorganise the internal political structure of the Monarchy and thereby save 
this venerable state from inevitable collapse, and also ensure a favourable 
formal state position for Croatia within the Central European civilizational 
sphere, did not achieve the expected results. Even prior to the formal end of the 
First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy disappeared, relinquishing 
its place to the new states which emerged from its ruins. The “South Slav 
question” was “resolved” outside of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and 
all of the Croatian lands, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, together with the 
Slovenian lands, became a part of the newly-created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes under the rule of the Karađorđević dynasty of Serbia.
III. The fate of Ivo Pilar in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/
yugoslavia (1918-1933)
After the end of the First World War and the dissolution of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, Pilar, under pressure from political opponents, decided 
to leave Tuzla and return to his native Zagreb, where he was allowed to open 
a law office in mid-1920.70 His move to Zagreb did not, however, usher in a 
peaceful time in his life. Indeed, as a politically suspect individual, whose 
judgements seriously brought into question the historical, geopolitical, 
religious and economic justification for the establishment of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, he was subjected to a show trial in 1921 together 
with Milan Šufflay, another distinguished Croatian intellectual.71 By taking 
Pilar before the courts, the Karađorđević regime intended to discredit him 
in the eyes of the Croatian intellectual and political public as a person with 
questionable moral values, apt to engage in clandestine activities (espionage). 
Ultimately, the trial closed with Pilar receiving a conditional one-year prison 
sentence.72
70   [Z. Matijević, ed.], “Ivo Pilar: Historijat moje veleizdajničke parnice u g. 1920.-22.,” Godišnjak 
Pilar, 2 (2002): 212.
71   Bosiljka Janjatović, Politički teror u Hrvatskoj 1918.-1935. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za pov-
ijest, Dom i svijet, 2002), pp. 191-221.
72   [Z. Matijević, ed.], “Ivo Pilar: Historijat moje veleizdajničke parnice,” 214.
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The political disfavour garnered by his struggle for the state independence 
of the Croatian people forced Pilar to keep his activities far from the eyes of the 
public and the repressive state apparatus.
Under the dictatorship of King Alexander, which was instituted through 
the deft exploitation of the assassination of Stjepan Radić on the floor of the 
National Parliament in Belgrade (1928/1929), by 1932 Pilar found himself 
compelled to offer Vladko Maček, the chairman of the then banned Croatian 
Peasant Party, his co-operation in the party’s “reorganisation”.73
In the solitude of his study, Pilar intensively contemplated the status of 
the Croatian people in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Taking 
into consideration the domestic and foreign factors which could influence the 
solution to the incendiary Croatian question, in his final book, Immer wieder 
Serbien (Berlin, 1933) – which he published under the unusual pseudonym 
Florian Lichtträger (the surname meaning “Lightbearer”) – offered a solution 
which was intended to stabilise the ill-fated Yugoslav state, but also eliminate 
the threat of a possible broader international conflict provoked by its permanent 
internal crisis. At that historical junction, Pilar claimed, the only medicine 
for the sickened Yugoslav state was – “thorough federalisation”, which must 
be implemented without delay.74 Even though he temporarily made pace with 
the Yugoslav state framework, Pilar never forsook the idea of establishing an 
independent Croatian state.
On 3 September 1933, Ivo Pilar was found dead “in front of a mirror with a 
bloodied temple” in his home in the Zagreb forest park Tuškanac.75 According 
to the official version, the Croatian intellectual committed suicide with a firearm 
(revolver). However, given that he was not an unbalanced individual given to 
uncontrolled outbursts, the rumour soon spread throughout Zagreb that he 
was the victim of an assassination for which the government in Belgrade was 
responsible.76 Pilar’s tragic death remains enshrouded in mystery to this day.
73   B. Jančiković, “Ivo Pilar i vodstvo privremeno zabranjene Hrvatske seljačke stranke,” Godišnjak 
Pilar, 1 (2001): 178.
74   Ivo Pilar, Uvijek iznova Srbija (Zagreb: Consilium, 1997), p. 122.
75   Željko Holjevac, “Problem Pilarove smrti,” Godišnjak Pilara, 1 (2001), 233-238.
76   R. Horvat, Hrvatska na mučilištu, p. 529.
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Dr. Ivo Pilar und die Kunst des möglichen. Kroatien zwischen mit-
teleuropa und dem balkan
Zusammenfassung
 Dr. Ivo Pilar (1874-1933), Jurist, Geopolitiker und Politiker, gehört 
zur Reihe hervorragendster kroatischer Intellektuellen der ersten Hälfte 
des 20. Jahrhunderts. Als politisch engagierter Publizist veröffentlicht er 
seine Werke in deutscher und kroatischer Sprache, oft unter Pseudony-
men (Zajedničar, L. von Südland, Florian Lichtträger). Während seines 
zwanzigjährigen Aufenthaltes in Bosnien und Herzegowina (in Sarajevo 
und Tuzla) nahm er aktiv an Politik teil. Er war einer von Gründern der 
Kroatischen Nationalgemeinschaft (Hrvatska narodna zajednica). Zu Be-
ginn seiner politischen Tätigkeit konfrontierte er sich politisch mit dem 
Erzbischof von Sarajevo, Dr. Josip Stadler, mit dem er aber später, während 
des Ersten Weltkrieges, in politischer Hinsicht eng mitwirkte. Im letzten 
Kriegsjahr wurde Pilar zum Mitglied der von Josip Frank geführten Re-
chtspartei, beziehungsweise ihres Klubs in Bosnien und Herzegowina. In 
seiner politischen Tätigkeit suchte er, seiner Meinung nach, die am meisten 
entsprechenden Lösungen für die existentiellen Bedürfnisse des kroatisch-
en Volkes innerhalb der Grenzen des mitteleuropäischen geopolitischen 
Raums. Die führenden politischen Kreise der Österreichisch-Ungarisch-
en Monarchie  hatten aber kein Verständnis für wichtige Resultate seiner 
Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich der möglichen Lösungen der kroatischen Frage 
in einem breiteren Kontext der damals außerordentlich wichtigen “Süds-
lawischen Frage”. Im Königreich der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen war 
er wegen seiner politischen Überzeugungen Persona non grata und wurde 
gerichtlich verfolgt. Während der Diktatur des Königs Aleksandar war 
er politisch vertraut mit der Leitung der damals verbotenen Kroatischen 
Bauernpartei (Hrvatska seljačka stranka). Sein gewaltsamer Tod bleibt bis 
heute ungeklärt.
